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VI. ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
VII. FEDERAL COURT CASES
VIII. LEGISLATION
I. JUDICIAL NoTIcE
The doctrine of judicial notice is that an indisputable proposition of
fact or a proposition of law of the jurisdiction is not subject to proof.
The doctrine thus serves to relieve the litigant of the burden of
proving certain facts and law, and is one of immense theoretical
implication for the trial lawyer. A fact which is judicially noticed
has much greater probative value than a fact which is proved, no
matter how strong the proof. Judicial notice thus offers the trial
lawyer an extremely effective, but apparently largely unused, device
in litigation. None of the cases involving judicial notice during the
survey period was concerned with the propriety of judicial notice
at the trial level. An appellate court, of course, can take judicial
notice of any matter of which a trial court could take judicial notice
and the contrary obviously follows.
One explanation for the failure of trial lawyers to take advantage of
judicial notice is that the doctrine appears to be used by the appellate
courts merely to support their opinions, most often in affirming a
decision. But sometimes a fact, if judicially noticed at the trial level,
could have swayed the trier of fact in a close case. In other instances,
a request for judicial notice would pinpoint the issue in such a way,
if granted, to make further argument irrelevant. And in still other
instances, a request for judicial notice can serve to inform the court
of the real issue involved in a case. Three cases decided during the
survey period illustrate these points.
Wood v. Edenfield Electric Co.,1 a workmen's compensation case, is
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 211 Tenn. 295, 364 S.W.2d 908 (1963).
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an example of an instance where a request for judicial notice might
have swayed the trier of fact in a close case. The plaintiff, a sixty-six
year old workman, suffered a hernia and had an operation; doctors
testified that the operation was successful and that there was no
permanent disability. The plaintiff testified as to his condition, giving
a contrary opinion. The trial court made an award of twelve and
one-half per cent permanent disability. The appellate court judicially
noticed that surgical operations leave scar tissue quite often with an
accompanying permanent tenderness and discomfort, which is ordi-
narily not disabling. The court made it clear that had it been the
trier of fact, it would have concluded that there was no permanent
disability; but because its duty was only to review the evidence to
determine whether there was material evidence to support the verdict,
it affirmed.2
State v. Hughes3 is an example of a case in which a request for
judicial notice by the defendant would have shown that further argu-
ment was irrelevant. The defendant moved to quash an indictment
charging him with driving a motor vehicle "in wilful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property upon said highway,
by driving said vehicle to his left across a yellow stripe in said high-
way.... ." The motion was granted and on appeal the supreme court
sustained. "This Court judicially knows that it is not always a violation
of the law of this State to drive 'to his left across a yellow stripe."'
A third case illustrates how a plaintiff was harmed by failing to
request judicial notice of a fact which would have informed the court
of the real issue involved. In Brannan v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,4 plaintiff landowners alleged that defendant had "no
right to build and use a higher tower or to relay transmissions in
another direction" under an earlier condemnation judgment by which
their land was taken. One of the bases of the allegations was that
the property involved was capable of being used for television relay
towers, and if defendant so used its new tower, it would be impossible
to use other areas of the tract for television relay towers and "thereby
valuable property rights will be lost" by plaintiffs. The lower court
had sustained demurrers to the bill, and the pertinent question here
involved as posed by the court was: "Has the defendant in any way
taken or exploited or trespassed on any property owned by the
complainants?"5 In support of their allegations, the plaintiffs cited
2. The plaintiff was sixty-eight at the time of the trial. Could the trial court have
taken judicial notice of the effect of this age on the ability of a man to do physical
labor?
3. 371 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1963).
4. 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d 236 (1962).
5. The other two questions, answered contrary to complainant's contentions, were:
"1. Was the 1953 condemnation judgment valid? 2. If it was valid, what limitations
were placed on the defendant's use of the land?" Id. at 703, 362 S.W.2d at 238.
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recent cases in which the flight of aircraft at low altitudes was held
to be a taking of the land because of interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land. The court distinguished these cases.
It is common knowledge that the air above the lands of the United States is
constantly traversed by countless numbers of radio signals and impulses.
We are confident that the sending of such signals has never been held an
actionable trespass or invasion of the rights of a landowner. No harm is done
nor interference with the use of the land created, no matter how low the
signals may pass or how frequently.6
What the court did not recognize, and what the plaintiffs did not
make clear, was that the plaintiffs were asking the court to take judicial
notice of the fact that recent developments in electronics and the
field of communications have made air rights sufficiently valuable to
constitute property subject to being the object of the tort of trespass. 7
Ironically, the court judicially noticed the fact which gave substance to
the complainant's allegations.
One of the dangers of judicial notice is that the court may judicially
notice an inference drawn from a general proposition, as well as the
proposition itself, where the determination of the issue in question
depends upon the inference. Once the proposition is noticed, there
must, of course, be an evidentiary basis on which the inference rele-
vant to the issue in question can be based. This was the problem
involved in Nicks v. Nicks, 8 although the court's opinion does not
refer to judicial notice.
The action was a very involved divorce proceeding, and the opinion
is not entirely clear on the facts;9 but the particular issue here involved
was the paternity of a child born to the wife during the divorce
proceedings. The court ordered two blood tests, the second one after
testimony to the effect that the first one was unreliable, primarily
because the child in question was not six months old at the time of
the test. The second test was made by a physician in New York, and
apparently the court used the results of this test to determine that
the husband was not the father of the child. This report, however,
was not offered in evidence by either party, was not presented by
the person preparing the report, was not offered under oath, or
6. Id. at 708-09, 362 S.W.2d at 241.
7. That the court did not recognize this is shown by its language that, "complainants
seem to be confused as to the effect of the 1953 condemnation judgment. By that
judgment only a small plot of ground was taken. They remain the owner in fee of
the remainder of the tract with all the rights and privileges that accompany such
ownership. Nothing prevents them from building an observation platform on a
mountain or selling land for a television relay tower." 362 S.W.2d at 241.
8. 369 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
9. The opinion, for example, states that the child in question was born on March
13, 1961, and later states that the trial court entered an order on February 23, 1961
concerning the "'minor child just born."' 369 S.W.2d at 912.
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otherwise identified "and was so irregularly handled as to actually
be left not a part of the record in this cause or available to the
appellant or her solicitors on this appeal whereby even the contents
of the report might be determined."10
Apparently, the results of the test were not even received and
considered until after the trial had been concluded and the cause
taken under advisement for decision. Thus, since at this stage of the
proceeding the tests could not possibly have been received as proof,
the trial court must have used the results of the test to take judicial
notice of the fact that the husband was not the father of the child.
Although the trial judge did not spell out this finding, the appellate
court said the finding was evident, since the husband was held to
have "'no legal responsibility"" for the child.
The appellate court reversed as to this holding, but based its
decision on Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-716, concerning
blood grouping tests to disprove paternity. The provisions of the
statute requiring the tests to be made by qualified persons in labora-
tories in Tennessee were not complied with." The court also seemed
to hold that such tests shall not be received "without an opportunity
afforded the parties involved to examine the witness who made the
tests as to his competency and as to the means employed by him, and
all other factors having to do with the reliability of such tests."12
In other cases, the courts judicially noticed that many persons who
can neither read nor write can sign their names' 3 and the statutory
and common law of the State of Texas, under Code sections 24-607
and 24-608.14 But the appellate courts still refuse to take judicial notice
of the rules of the circuit courts.'5
II. PRESUn=oNs
Presumptions were involved in only a few cases during the survey
period, and no case showed an effort to discuss this confused area in
a comprehensive manner. MacFarland v. Wofford 6 was a proceeding
to review an order of the Commissioner of Revenue for forfeiture of
an automobile which contained unstamped whiskey. The statute
under which the Commissioner acted, Tennessee Code Annotated sec-
10. 369 S.W.2d at 913.
11. The court also said that the tests were made before the child was six months
old. The judge's order for the tests was dated August 17, 1961, but the order pro-
vided for the blood samples to be taken on September 20, 1961. If the child were
born on March 13, 1961, as stated in the opinion, it would have been six months old.
12. 369 S.W.2d at 914.
13. Bradford v. Bradford, 364 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
14. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Templeton, 50 Tenn. App. 615, 362 S.W.2d 938 (W.S.
1962,).-
15. Horn v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
16. 211 Tenn. 309, 364 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1962).
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tion 57-622, provides for the forfeiture of a car containing unstamped
whiskey for gift, sale, or distribution, and further makes the presenceof such whiskey in a car prima facie evidence that it is for the
proscribed purposes. The arresting officers had found a partly filled
pint bottle of whiskey in the automobile in question. The court
sustained the circuit court in reversing the Commissioner, saying that
when evidence was offered that the whiskey was not for distribution,
gift, or sale, the presumption disappeared. All the evidence in the
record showed that the occupants of the car had it there for the
purpose of drinking.
Logically, a presumption is nothing more than an inference from
a proved fact. Legally, a presumption is such an inference given
effect by the law. When the "presumption disappears," the effect is
not to remove the inference, but to remove the force of law behind
the inference. The presumption then becomes a mere inference to
be considered on a par with inferences arising from other evidence.
This, apparently, is what the Commissioner did not understand. He
treated the presumption as having substantive force when in fact
it was only a procedural device for requiring the defendant to explain
the presence of the whiskey in the car. The court emphasized this
point when it said that the state has the burden of proving affirmative
allegations upon which the right to forfeiture exists.
Before a presumption can be used, of course, the basic fact must
be proved. If, in proving the basic fact, the inference which would
arise from the basic fact is negated, the presumption never
comes into play. This is what happened in Walters v. Kee,1" a
tort action involving an automobile owned by defendant company,
from whom the co-defendant had obtained possession for test driving
and demonstrating to his parents. The plaintiff contended that he
was entitled to go to the jury against defendant company under the
presumptions in Code sections 59-1038 and 59-414, making registra-
tion prima facie evidence of ownership, and creating a presumption
that one operating the vehicle was doing so for the owner's benefit.
The plaintiff's evidence, however, had shown that the co-defendant
was using the automobile for his own purposes, to take himself and
his companions to Kentucky Lake for recreation. The appellate court
affirmed the directed verdict for the defendant company.
A similar point was involved in Caldwell v. Adams,18 a tort action
against defendant truck operator and his employer. The plaintiff
sought to rely on a presumption that the operator was acting within
the scope of his employment. The evidence, however, showed that
the operator in the course of his driving had gone "on a frolic of his
17. 366 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
18. 367 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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,own," by, stopping at a tavern to drink beer for two hours. The court
said: "This uncontradicted evidence, we think, destroyed the arbitrary
presumption of the statute .... 'A legal presumption... is an assump-
tion for convenience, but where proof to the contrary is introduced,
the assumption is waived for it is no longer logical to assume a fact
which is refuted by positive testimony.""19
The force of a given presumption determines the amount of
evidence necessary to overcome it. In the case of a presumption
which is purely procedural, little evidence is required to remove the
force of law behind a given inference. Where, however, the presump-
tion is a manifestation of public policy, it may attain a status very
close to that of a rule of substantive law. In such instances, some-
thing in the nature of positive proof is required to overcome the
presumption., Such is the case with the presumption of legitimacy,
as shown by Anderson v. Anderson.20 The action was an ejectment
proceeding concerning property descended from a former slave. The
two questions involved were the legitimacy of Sam Anderson and the
legitimacy of his children. The chancellor had determined that all of
them were illegitimate. The appellate court reversed, using the pre-
sumption of legitimacy, "one of the strongest presumptions known
to the law" to determine that they were legitimate. There was no
direct proof that Sam Anderson was legitimate or illegitimate, and the
presumption as to him prevailed rather easily. There was evidence,
however, that Sam Anderson had never considered himself to be
married to the mother of the three children, that the mother had
subsequently married another, and that Sam Anderson himself had
considered his progeny to be "outside children." The court said:
In view of the extremely long time which has elapsed between the birth of
these three children and the trial of this cause we hold that the evidence of
reputation among the family of Sam Anderson during his later years is in-
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the legitimacy of the three
children ....
In Smith v. State,2 1 the court reiterated the rule that the fact of
killing with a deadly weapon raises a presumption of malice in the
absence of evidence to rebut this presumed fact, but held that the
evidence was sufficient to rebut the malice.
III. CmcumsTANTIAL EvIDENCE
Circumstantial evidence is evidence which tends to prove the proposition
in question, but is not necessarily inconsistent with other propositions.
Direct evidence, on the other hand, tends to prove the disputed proposition
19. 367 S.W.2d at 807.
20. 372 S.W.2d 452 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
21. 370 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. 1963).
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and is inconsistent with any other proposition. In a civil case where
circumstantial evidence is used, it is sufficent for "the party having the
burden of proof to make out the more probable hypothesis, and the
evidence need not arise to that degree of certainty that will exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis or conclusion. However, where there are two
or more equally probable hypothesis [sic] appearing, and either could
equally have caused the injury or damage, the Jury cannot speculate or
guess or surmise that any certain one was the cause and cannot find for the
plaintiff on such basis.
This language in the charge to the jury was approved as stating
the correct law in Kee v. Hill, a companion case to Walters v. Kee,
discussed previously.
A special form of circumstantial evidence is the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, also involved in the Hill case. Where the conditions for res
ipsa loquitur are present, the fact of the injury, in the absence of
explanation by defendant, permits the jury to infer the defendant's
negligence "'in preference to other permissible or reasonable infer-
ences from the facts and circumstances.' "2
The key problem in the use of circumstantial evidence is that of
relevance. Since direct evidence is consistent with the disputed
proposition and no other, there is ordinarily no problem of relevance
where direct evidence is involved, as there is with circumstantial
evidence. The relevancy of the circumstantial evidence can best be
determined by examining the premise upon which the offer of the
evidence is based. This problem occurred in Ivey v. State,24 in which
the supreme court reversed for the admission of irrelevant circum-
stantial evidence. The court did not analyze the case in terms of the
premise underlying the offer of the circumstantial evidence, but the
case can best be understood by so doing.
The defendant was convicted of the murder of a seventeen year
old girl. His defense was that he accidentally killed her with his car,
panicked and hid the body, which was not found until he revealed
its location. Because the case was reversed for a new trial, the court
discussed only the evidence which was the basis for reversal. This
evidence was that defendant, a married man with children, had
improper associations with other women, and that his wife had
threatened to leave him if he continued these associations. The pur-
pose of the evidence was to prove motive. The premise upon which
the evidence was based was that a man who has improper associations
with women and whose wife threatens to leave him because of such
associations will probably kill a woman with whom he has been
22. 366 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
23. 366 S.W.2d at 525.
24. 210 Tenn. 422, 360 S.W.2d I (Tenn. 1962).
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associating to prevent his wife from learning of his relationship with
her. The premise is a tenuous one at best, but the flaw in the state's
evidence was that there was no evidence that defendant had any
relationship with the victim at all. A factual basis for the premise
underlying the circumstantial evidence must, of course, be shown
to exist by the evidence. Here, however, the state was attempting to
have the jury infer a fact of the evidential proposition supported by
the premise. This proposition in turn was to be used to support an
inference that defendant murdered the deceased. The failure of the
state to show any relationship between the defendant and the victim
made the evidence irrelevant and prejudicial.
A. Evidence of Other Crimes
Certain types of circumstantial evidence occur so frequently that
the rules regarding their admission have become stereotyped. Such
is the case with evidence of other crimes. The rule is generally
stated that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove that
defendant committed a particular crime, subject to a group of excep-
tions. This statement of the rule is misleading in that the rule is that
evidence of other crimes generally is not admissible to show disposi-
tion to commit crimes as proof of the commission of a particular
crime. However, evidence of other crimes is admissible when used
to prove a material issue on trial, such as motive, intent, the absence
of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan for the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that the proof of one
tends to establish the other, or identity of the defendant. These rules
do constitute exceptions to a general statement that evidence of
other crimes is inadmissible, but they do not constitute exceptions
to the rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes to prove disposition
to commit a crime. Thus, there are in fact two rules, not a rule and
exceptions.
This problem was dealt with in Carroll v. State, 5 a particularly
unsavory case in which defendant was convicted of rape. The evi-
dence showed that defendant: (1) broke and entered an apartment
in the night time; (2) assaulted and disabled the victim's husband;
(3) forced victim to engage in sexual perversion with him; (4)
raped the victim; (5) left the apartment and broke into another;
(6) forced the woman occupant of that apartment at the point of a
knife to engage in sexual perversion; (7) assaulted the woman with
intent to force her to have intercourse with him. The defendant
alleged error in the admission of evidence of items (5), (6), and (7)
above, relative to incidents in the second apartment "as evidence of
25. 370 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1963).
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other and independent crimes which did not elucidate or tend to
prove defendant's guilt of the charges upon trial. .. ."
The court held the evidence admissible on several different grounds.
(1) They were part of the same transaction. "'Evidence of another
and distinct crime is admissible if it was committed as a part of the
same transaction and forms part of the res gestae." (2) The evidence
tended to establish motive, criminal intent, and the absence of
mistake or accident. (3) The third basis, as opposed to the two
others, was a true exception to the rule that evidence of other crimes
is not admissible to show disposition to commit a crime. The court
approved the modern tendency in cases involving sex crimes and
abnormal sex practices, "'to admit evidence of disposition and, as
proof of disposition, evidence of other offenses of the same kind.'"
Kennedy v. Crumley2 6 involved the problem of the use of prior
convictions in a civil case. The action was against the operator and
owners of an automobile for injuries received in an automobile acci-
dent on September 11, 1960. The plaintiff introduced evidence that
the operator of the car had been convicted of reckless driving on
October 22, 1955, driving while intoxicated on March 19, 1957,
and of public drunkenness on December 22, 1956. The purpose of
the evidence was to show negligence by the owners in entrusting
their automobile to an incompetent driver, or to one whom they
should have known was incompetent.
The court said that evidence of specific acts of carelessness, reck-
lessness, or intoxication may be shown on the issue of the incom-
petency of the driver of an automobile, and that it is competent to
show the entruster knew of specific acts. But the admission of the
evidence in this case was erroneous as there was no showing that
the owners had knowledge of these convictions, or other facts which
would put them on notice. The court also said the convictions were
too remote to be of any evidential value upon the issue of the
knowledge of the defendants of the incompetency of the operator.
B. Character
Character evidence is another type of circumstantial evidence
around which there has developed a body of stereotyped rules. In
Taylor v. State,2 7 the defendant alleged error on the part of the trial
court in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine his character witness
by asking him if he knew "that Taylor had been arrested for gambling
and had fought with the arresting officers when he was taken into
custody for this offense." The appellate court said that it was entirely
26. 367 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
27. 369 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1963).
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proper to question the character witness "about certain charges or
rumors of misconduct that he had heard, facts known to him, etc.,
for the purpose of testing the value of the witness' evidence in
chief."
Such examination is generally held proper, except that most juris-
dictions permit the questions to be phrased only in the form, "Have
you heard," rather than "Do you know," since it is the witness'
knowledge of defendant's reputation, not his knowledge of defendant's
conduct that is being tested. The distinction may be a technical one
and of little importance if instruction is given limiting the jury to the
use of the evidence for the purpose of impeachment. But the court
in the Taylor case further held that the defendant is not entitled to
such limiting instruction.
IV. OPINION TESTIMONY
Normally, lay opinion evidence, as opposed to fact evidence, is
inadmissible. But the distinction between fact and opinion is one of
degree, not kind, and courts do admit lay opinion evidence in many
instances. One example of this is a layman's opinion as to physical
condition. In American Surety Co. v. Kizer,28 a workmen's compensa-
tion case, the court said: "It has long been recognized that a lay wit-
ness may testify as to his own physical condition or that of another
person provided such witness first states the detailed facts and then
gives his conclusions."29
The opinion of an expert, of course, is generally admissible, since
the reason for the expert's testimony is to give an opinion to aid the
jury. However, even the expert must show a basis for his opinion,
not hearsay, which explains the necessity for hypothetical questions.
In Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Treadwell,30 the problem of hearsay
basis for the expert's opinion was involved. A doctor testified in a
workmen's compensation case that it was his opinion that the plain-
tiffs disability was one-hundred per cent. But to support his con-
clusion he had examinations made by others, whose conclusions were
given to him, and which, he said, supported his own conclusion. The
trial court overruled an objection that the opinion of the doctor was
based on hearsay information not in the record. The appellate court
said that the general rule that testimony of medical experts based on
hearsay is inadmissible is subject to "many fluctuations depending
entirely on how the case was tried and conducted." The court affirmed
on the basis that the finding of the trial judge and the conclusion of
28. 369 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1963).
29. 369 S.W.2d at 740. See also Wood v. Edenfield Elec. Co., 364 S.W.2d 908
(Tenn. 1963).
30. 367 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1963).
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the doctor were not based on the hearsay; the doctor had already
formed his conclusion and used the hearsay information merely to
sustain that conclusion.
The expert's opinion, in order to support a finding, must not be
mere conjecture, speculation, or surmise. This was the objectionable
feature of the expert's opinion in another workmen's compensation
case. To a question of whether the injury would affect plaintiff's
eyesight, the expert replied, "very possibly, if he gets to the point




Surprisingly, the problem of hearsay was involved in only a few
cases during the survey period, but four cases deserve particular
comment. These cases involved the problem of admissions, con-
fessions, and prior testimony.
A. Admissions
There is a sharp distinction between admissions and declara-
tions against interest, which are often confused, as in Wooten v.
Curry.- An admission is a statement made by a party (or someone
who had the authority to make the statement for the party); the
admitter need not have personal knowledge of the fact asserted in the
admission, and he need not be unavailable as a witness. The admis-
sion may have been highly self-serving when made, and it is receivable
only against the admitter (or one who stands in the same position
as if he had personally made the admission). A declaration against
interest may be made by one who is an entire stranger to the parties
to the action, but it must be made by one who had personal knowl-
edge and who is unavailable as a witness. The declaration against
interest must have been disserving when made, and it is admissible
whenever relevant.33
The Wooten case was a malpractice action against a physician who
had performed a hysterectomy on plaintiff, subsequent to which the
plaintiff's female organs were malformed. The testimony in question
was to the effect that the defendant said, "'he was sorry it happened
and could have probably avoided it if he had checked on her as he
should."' The court's opinion refers to this testimony as "an admission
or declaration against interest," without indicating which it was.
The question involved was not admissibility, but whether this
evidence was sufficient to require a submission of the case to the
31. Maryland Gas. Co. v. Young, 362 S.W.2d 241, at 243 (Tenn. 1962).
32. 362 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962). Two cases, one an action by the
wife, the other by the husband.
33. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVImENCE 297-98 (1962).
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jury, and the failure to distinguish between the two types of hearsay
resulted in a confusing opinion. The defendant contended "that de-
clarations against interest and admissions made by a physician are
not competent evidence of negligence in an action for malpractice."
But the court said the admissibility of such statement is to be
governed "by the same rules as if the statement had been made by
the declarant as a witness. It is necessary, of course, that it be
contrary to the interest of the declarant and, if in the form of an
opinion, about a subject upon which the declarant would be com-
petent to speak as an expert witness."3 Subsequently, the court
cited, "Cases holding expressions by a physician more or less similar
to that here involved competent as an admission and sufficient to
carry the case to the jury... . "
It seems that when a statement which would be a declaration
against interest is made by a party to the action, it constitutes an
admission. However, the requirements for an admission are con-
siderably more lenient than those for a declaration against interest.
And the Wooten case seems to say that for an admission to be suf-
ficient evidence to make a jury question, the admission must satisfy
certain requirements necessary for a declaration against interest.
B. Confessions
A confession in a criminal case is analogous to an admission in a
civil case, although the requirements for the two vary considerably.
In Grove v. State,3 the court was faced with a confession problem
of first impression in Tennessee. The defendants, convicted of armed
robbery, sought to introduce a number of confessions of other crimes
unrelated to the charge "for the purpose of showing that the confes-
sions made in this case were coerced or forced through beating or
otherwise." The defendants argued that they could prove that they
did not commit the crimes to which they confessed. It was not made
clear when the other confessions had been made, but the court re-
fused to allow the evidence.
The court, quoting from a Maryland case, concluded that evidence
that a confession of another crime was false would not prove the
falsity of the confession of the crime charged in the indictment, and
would be wholly irrelevant to the issue.
'In order to determine the truth or falsity of the confessions of the other
crimes, the court would be called upon to receive evidence concerning
offenses not charged in the indictment in this case. The practical effect
34. 362 S.W.2d at 823.
35. 362 S.W.2d at 824. (Emphasis added.)
36. 365 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1963).
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would be that the State, in order to prove one case, would be required to
establish the appellant's guilt in four cases. 37
In Dykes v. State,38 defendant agreed to plead guilty upon con-
tinuance of his case to the next term. The case was tried upon a
plea of not guilty, and defendant alleged error in allowing testimony
as to this agreement. The court sustained him and reversed. The
Tennessee rule is that a withdrawn plea of guilty cannot be shown
in evidence as a judicial confession, and the same reasoning applies to
an agreement to plead guilty. The state was held to have waived
the agreement by proceeding to trial on the pleas of not guilty.
C. Prior Testimony
Tennessee Bar Association v. Freemoen3 9 was an action to disbar
defendant on two grounds, one of which was that defendant en-
trapped the wife of a client into committing adultery for the purposes
of divorce. The court in the divorce action sustained the charge of
entrapment and dismissed the bill for divorce for that and other
reasons. The decree, however, contained no finding that defendant
knowingly participated in the scheme of entrapment. In the disbar-
ment proceeding, the chancellor used testimony in the divorce case
as substantive evidence against the defendant.
The appellate court held this to be error on the ground that,
even though there is authority that disbarment proceedings are sui
generis, "the better rule is that the same rules of evidence which apply
in other judicial proceedings control the admissibility of evidence
in disbarment proceedings." Thus, the general rule "that testimony
given in a former proceeding is not sufficient to give it the status of
proof in another action" was applied.
VI. ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Even before the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio" held that evi-
dence obtained by illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in a state
court, the rule in Tennessee was to exclude such evidence. Thus, it
would seem that the Mapp decision had little significance for Ten-
nessee attorneys. However, Hill v. State4' indicates that the rule in
Tennessee is merely a rule of evidence. If this is so, the Tennessee
Supreme Court should re-examine the procedure it requires of a
defendant to enforce the right to have illegally obtained evidence
excluded. The rule is no longer a privilege, the exercise of which
37. 365 S.W.2d at 876.
38. 372 S.W.2d 184 (Tenn. 1963).
39. 362 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. 367 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn. 1963).
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depends upon compliance with strict technical procedures, but a
constitutional right protected by the fourth amendment through the
fourteenth amendment.
The Hill case involved a violation of the liquor laws, and the de-
fendant raised the issue of illegal search and seizure three times. He
objected to the receipt of certain evidence after direct examination
of the state's one witness, and after cross examination of the same
witness, he moved to exclude the evidence. After re-direct and
re-cross examination, the state rested, and the defendant moved for
a dismissal of the charge on the ground of illegal search. Upon
denial of this motion, the defendant took the stand to testify as to
the search and nothing else. He was asked whether the prosecuting
witness had testified differently at the preliminary hearing. The court
ruled that if defendant went into that line of questions and answers,
he would be outside the scope of the search, and could be examined
as to any part of the case. The defendant left the stand, and this
ruling was the principal ground relied upon for reversal.
No error was alleged against the ruling that the evidence was
competent, and the appellate court dealt only with the proper
procedure to be used in determining the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence. Relying on prior cases, the court said the
procedure to be followed in determining the admissibility of evidence
where the issue of illegal search is raised "is the same as that followed
when objection is raised as to the admissibility of a confession or a
dying declaration."4 This issue is for the trial judge to determine,
and "when an objection is made to the offered evidence, the approved
practice is for the Court to hear full testimony of all the relevant
facts and circumstances in the absence of the jury and then rule
upon the admissibility of the testimony offered."43
The opinion is unsatisfactory because the issue as raised at the
trial was much narrower than the one dealt with by the court in its
opinion. The issue as raised was whether the question put by de-
fendant's counsel was within the scope of the search, and not whether
defendant could testify only on the issue of the search. The trial
court was apparently willing to let the defendant testify on the
issue of the search alone, but did not consider the question pro-
pounded as being within the scope of the search. The appellate
court, however, did not deem it necessary to deal with this narrow
issue, because defendant had failed to follow the proper procedure
and in effect lost his right to complain. Said the court: "In order
to put the trial court in error for not permitting the defendant to
testify as to the circumstances of the search only, he must offer himself




as a witness on this issue before calling for and obtaining from the
court a ruling on the very issues and before the State closes its
proof."44 Thus, the court seems to be saying that the trial court, under
such circumstances, can do what it pleases, either allow the defendant
to testify on the issue of the search only or not, without being in
error. But would it have been error to refuse any evidence by
defendant on the issues of the search after the state rested its case?
The court implies again that the trial court could not be in error.
"Since it is the duty of the Judge and not the jury to make the
decision as to the legality of the search, it is incumbent upon both
parties to offer all of their proof on this question before calling for a
ruling from the Court."45
It is not, of course, at all unusual for appellate opinions to be
criticized and called unsatisfactory. But in this the courts are not
always wholly to blame, for they must take the case as it is presented
to them. Thus, a large share of the responsibility for unsatisfactory
opinions must be shared by the bar. The Hill case itself seems to
be in this category. Nevertheless, it would seem that the Tennessee
Supreme Court should at the earliest opportunity review the proper
procedure to be followed in illegal search and seizure cases in the
light of the Mapp case.
VII. FEDERAL COURT CASES
The federal court cases involving evidence in this survey are
unique in that they were all decided by the same judge and all dealt
with the violation of internal revenue liquor laws. They should all
be required reading for revenue agents in eastern Tennessee.
In United States v. Ramsey,46 the question was whether, when the
defense of entrapment is urged, the prosecution shall be required to
offer as a witness a paid informer on whose entrapping activities the
conviction rested. The court concluded first "that federal trial courts
have the duty to require fair and lawful conduct from federal agents
in furnishing evidence of crime." Expressing grave concern about the
fairness of the agents' activities, the court then decided that the
defendant had a right to be faced with the paid informer.
Three cases were on motion to suppress as evidence moonshine
whiskey obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure. The court
granted all three motions.47 The cases, of course, turn on their
particular facts, which do not warrant discussion here, but all of them
44. 367 S.W.2d at 463.
45. Ibid.
46. 220 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
47. United States v. Souther, 211 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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involved arrest and seizure on private property without warrants, or
what the court determined was reasonable justification.
In United States v. Plemmons,' the search was made under a
warrant, issued upon the affidavit of an officer that he had observed
odor of mash in the vicinity and that a fellow officer had reported
the operation of a distillery on the premises. The defendant con-
tended the affidavit was insufficient to authorize a search. The court
disagreed, saying that hearsay alone does not render an affidavit
insufficient. The Commissioner was not obliged to require the
informants or their affidavits to be produced so long as there was a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. The agent's knowledge
that mash was somewhere in the immediate area was reasonably
corroborative of the facts reported to him.
VIII. LEGISLATION
There were several statutes on evidence passed by the legislature
during 1963, the most significant of which dealt with confessions
and "admissions against interest" in criminal cases.49 This statute
provides that a criminal defendant is entitled upon demand to a
copy of any confession or "admission against interest" made to a law
enforcement officer or agency of the state, together with a list of the
names and addresses of all persons present when the statement was
made. If the statement was not reduced to writing, a list of the names
and addresses of all persons present when the statement was made
shall be furnished. Failure to comply with the statute means that
the confession or admission against interest shall not be admitted
as evidence.
Three acts dealing with the trial of civil actions were apparently
enacted to clarify and make uniform certain procedures in Tennessee
courts which have heretofore varied somewhat with individual judges.
One provides that counsel shall be permitted to use dehonstrative
evidence in his argument to the jury "for the purpose of illustrating his
contentions with respect to the issues which are to be decided by
the jury."50 Another provides that counsel shall be allowed to argue
the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury.51 The
third provides that "counsel shall be permitted to read his entire
declaration.., to the jury at the beginning of the lawsuit, and may
refer to same in argument or summation to the jury."52
48. 223 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
49. TEN. CODE ANN. § 40-2441 (Supp. 1963).
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1326 (Supp. 1963).
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1327 (Supp. 1963).
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1328 (Supp. 1963).
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Code section 59-930, enacted during 1963, requires safety belts in
the front seats of all cars sold in Tennessee beginning with the 1964
models. The statute, however, eliminates a potentially litigious point
by providing that in no event shall "failure to wear seat belts be
considered as contributory negligence, nor shall failure to wear said
seat belts be considered in mitigation of damages on the trial of any
civil action."
